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Abst ract .  This paper draws a distinction between the set of explicit beliefs of 
a reasoner, the "belief base", and the beliefs that are merely implicit. We study 
syntax-based belief changes that are governed exclusively by the structure of 
the belief base. In answering the question whether this kind of belief change 
can be reconstructed with the help of something like an epistemic entrench- 
ment relation in the sense of G~rdenfors and Makinson [8], we extract several 
candidate relations from a belief base. The answer to our question is negative, 
but an approximate solution is possible, and in some cases the agreement is
even perfect. Two interpretations of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment 
are offered. It is argued that epistemic entrenchment properly understood in- 
volves multiple belief changes, i.e., changes by sets of sentences. Since none of 
our central definitions presupposes the presence of propositional connectives in 
the object language, the notion of epistemie ntrenchment becomes applicable 
to the style of knowledge representation realized in inheritance networks and 
truth maintenance systems. 
1. In t roduct ion  
1.1. Representat ion  o f  be l ie fs  
Our model  of belief will be a simple one. A belief is represented by a sentence in 
some (regimented) language. Research done in Artif icial Intell igence has recently 
lead to a revival of the logic of belief. It was felt that  a clear dist inct ion should 
be drawn between the explicit and the implicit beliefs of a reasoner [14, 18]. The 
former ones are those that  the reasoner would assent to if asked and for which he 
has some kind of independent  warrant.  The lat ter  ones are those that  follow, by 
some specified logic, from the set of explicit beliefs. 
We dist inguish a belief base, the set of expl icit  beliefs, from a belief set. A belief 
set is closed under logical consequences, it is a theory in the logician's sense. In 
general, we conceive of bel ief sets as generated by belief bases. Let us say that  H is 
a belief base for the belief set K if and only if K is the set of all logical consequences 
of H,  i.e., if K = Cn(H). 
We must  make a decision what to count as a belief state. A belief state is that  
kind of thing, pre-theoret ical ly  understood,  that  is changed when we change our 
beliefs. As we cannot read off from a belief set K which beliefs in it are the expl icit  
ones, a belief s tate cannot be just  a belief set. Should we then say that  a belief state 
is model led by a belief base H?  Of course, we then have no problem in generat ing 
the full bel ief set, provided we have fixed an appropr iate  logic Cn. So everything 
! 40  
we could possibly want to know about the set of currently entertained beliefs can 
be answered if" H is known. However, as we shall see, there is a dynamical problem 
with this conception. In the sort of changes we shall consider, we cannot satisfy two 
desiderata t the same time: the desideratum that the changed belief state can be 
characterized by a belief base, and the desideratum that this belief base contains the 
set of explicit beliefs after the change has been effected. This is an unpleasant state 
of affairs which we shall have to put up with in this paper. Giving an answer to our 
question, we say that a belief state is a pair (H, K) such that H is a belief base for 
K. However, the reader be warned that our change operations are not making belief 
states out of belief states in response to a certain input. We shall explain this in the 
next section. 
Before doing that, let us delineate the object language and its logic. The logic 
of belief change, and especially the theory of epistemic entrenchment, has been 
discussed for a language with the expressiveness of propositional logic, including all 
its connectives -,, A, V, ~ and ~,  as well as the truth and falsity constants T 
and Z. In contrast o this, we aim at reducing the linguistic prerequisites. Our 
considerations are to apply also to systems using severely restricted languages, as 
encountered e.g. in inheritance nets or truth (reason) maintenance systems. 
Correspondingly, the logic governing our language has to obey only structural 
rules. We require that it is reflexive, monotonic, transitive, and compact. We refer 
to our logic either as a consequence operator Cn or as an inference relation F-, with 
the usual understanding that r E Cn(H) iff H ~- r In the first notation our four 
requirements become 
(a) H c Cn(H) 
(M) If H C_ H' then Cn(H) C_ Cn(H') 
(T)  Cn(Cn(H)) C_ Cn(H) 
(C) If r E Cn(H) then r E Cn(H') for some finite subset H' of H 
When we link our considerations to earlier work, we make use of connectives. 
Then the logic is further supposed to be supraclassical, i.e., what follows classically 
from a given premise set should follow from it in Cn. We also assume that Cn 
satisfies the deduction theorem. 
1.2. Dynamics  
A belief change occurs if a belief state is changed in order to accommodate it to a 
certain input. In the case we are going to deal with, the input comes in the form of 
(explicit) beliefs. In the research program initiated by AlchourrSn, Giirdenfors and 
Makinson ([3]; for excellent surveys, see [6] and [16]), belief states are identified with 
belief sets, and inputs are single sentences. Still working in broadly the same research 
program, Fuhrmann [4, 5] and Hansson [9, 10, 11] offer modetlings for two important 
generalizations. They investigate what happens when belief states are identified with 
belief bases (with belief sets as special eases) and when the input comes in sets of 
sentences (with singletons as special cases). In short, they generalize the theory of 
belief change to base changes and multiple changes. 
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It is clear from the very beginning that the idea of base change is indeed com- 
pelling. True, it is reasonable to say that what an agent really believes is the belief 
set K, including the full set of his implicit beliefs. But it is at least as reasonable to 
think of belief change operations as acting on the set of explicit beliefs alone. After 
all, merely implicit beliefs have a secondary status, they are derived from the explicit 
ones. And if some of the explicit beliefs they depend on should have to give way, so 
should they! This is a foundationalist picture of belief revision and contrasts with 
the coherentist picture predominant in the current heory of belief revision [7, 13]. 
We will endorse the philosophy of base change in this paper. 
Again, it is a good idea to be ready for set-like inputs. But this issue does 
not seem to have the same philosophical force as base contraction. Philosophically, 
base change is an alternative to theory change, while multiple change is just an 
extension of singleton change. There seems to be no intimate connection between 
these two kinds of deviation from the original framework of Alehourrdn, Cgrdenfors 
and Makinson. However, we shall argue that multiple belief changes play a significant 
role in the analysis of base changes. 
1.3. Three  types  of  bel ief  change 
The simplest type of belief change is the addition of a new belief r (or a set of 
beliefs) which is consistent with the old beliefs. In this case, we have no problem to 
identify the relevant operations. We can effect theory change through base change. 
Using the symbol '+', we define consistent additions as follows: 
K + r : Cn(K  u {r 
Notice that '+'  has two different meanings here, depending on whether its first 
argument is supposed to be a belief base or a belief set. It is obvious how to generalize 
these definitions when the input comes in sets. However, the generalization will be 
far from obvious in the remaining cases, so we shall restrict ourselves to singleton 
inputs in the rest of this section. 
The operation of accommodating a belief state to some input is considerably 
more difficult if the latter is inconsistent with the former. In this case, it is held 
that consistency should act as an integrity constraint for our belief system. For 
such beli@contravenin 9 additions, we shall adopt the following idea: In order to 
rationally include r into the set fI (or K) of your beliefs, first make H (or K)  
consistent with r i.e., recant the commitment to -~r and then add r consistently 
to the resulting set. It is common to use the term 'revision' to cover both consistent 
and belief-contravening additions, and to use the symbols ' , '  for revisions and ' - '  
for contractions. The above idea which is credited to Isaac Levi in the literature 
then becomes: 
H,  r = (H'-~r + r = (H-~r o {r 
K ,  r = (K-' ~r + r : C~((K-~r 0 {r 
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This is the Levi identity, in its two versions for base and for theory change. One 
may think that the Levi identity is not of much help as long as we do not know how 
the contraction operation -' behaves. This is right, but still it reduces the problem 
of finding suitable revision operations to the problem of finding suitable contraction 
operations. Philosophically, contraction appears to be the more fundamental oper- 
ation. Like most authors in belief revision, we shall follow Levi's advice and study 
contractions in the following. 
What is this fundamental interesting operation called 'contraction'? The con- 
traction of a set of beliefs with respect o an input sentence r is a subset of the 
original beliefs which does not logically imply r (In a sense, "input sentences" for 
contractions are rather "output sentences".) The concept of logical consequence is 
obviously relevant here. In case we start with a belief set K, we should end up with 
another belief set K ' - r  which is logically closed again. In contrast o the case of 
additions, we do not want to stipulate that the contracted belief set K - r  can always 
be identified with the set of logical consequences of a new belief base H- r  We will 
explain why presently. 
1.4. The  basic idea of min imal  change 
When forced to perform a belief change, it seems rational to preserve as many of the 
prior beliefs as possible . Many writers have embraced such a condition of minimal 
change (minimum mutilation, maximal conservativity, informational economy) for 
many different purposes [17]. We will use the label 'minimal change approach' as a 
proper name for that account of belief revision which covers at least maxichoice, full, 
and partial meet contraction in the sense of Alchourrdn, G~irdenfors and Makinson 
[3]. 
This is the basic idea of minimal change: In order to contract a belief base H 
(or a belief set K) with respect o r look at the maximal subsets of H (of K) 
which do not imply r Since every piece of information is valuable, no gratuitous 
loss of beliefs is tolerated. Accordingly, we maysay that a set H1 of beliefs is better 
than (or preferred to) a set H2 (relative to the belief base H) if H1 preserves more 
explicit beliefs than H2, that is, if H2 A H is a proper subset of H1 R H. If H1 and 
/-/2 are subsets of H, this of course reduces to / /2  C H1. Generalizing a bit, we say 
that a set ~1 of sets of sentences i better than (or preferred to) a set ~2 of sets of 
sentences, in symbols 7{2 K H1, if for every //2 in 7Y2 there is an H1 in 7$1 with 
H2nH C H~ nH.  
2. Base  cont ract ion  and  mul t ip le  cont ract ion  
In the following, the term 'base contraction' is not to be taken literally. What is 
changed is the theory K = Cn(H) generated by a base H. But how the theory 
is changed depends on the way it is axiomatized, on the form of H. For instance, 
while H = {p, q} and H I = {p A q} generate the same theory K, we expect that 
K-p  contains q if K is axiomatized by H, but that q is lost if K is axiomatized by 
H'.  In the latter case, q is inseperable from p. Throughout this paper, we assume 
that syntactical information (the structure of explicit beliefs) is the sole mechanism 
controlling belief change. 
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The minimal change approach is afflicted with a decisive difficulty. In general, 
there is more than one solution to the minimal change problem, i.e., more than one 
maximal set of beliefs which does not imply r Following Alchourrdn and Makinson 
[1], we let H_I_r denote the set of all maximal subsets of H which fail to imply r 
The point is that there is usually more than just one member in H•162 What then to 
do? Assuming that only the syntactical information provided by the base governs a 
theory's dynamical behaviour, we adopt an egalitarians's point of view. All elements 
of H ie  are to be treated equally.1 
The bold or credulous option is mazichoice base change: In order to eliminate r
from K, choose one element of H•162 at random, and close under Cn. 
DEFINITION 1. Let H be a base for H and 7 be a (single-valued) choice function 
which selects, for every nonempty set H_Lr an arbitrary element H' of H_Lr Then 
the max• base contraction over K determined by H and 7 is given by 
CE K : r  iff Vr  andT(Hlr162 or~r  andCEK.  
Being maximally conservative, max• contraction comes as close to the idea 
of minimal change as possible. However, if we do not have any information to 
govern the choice of some particular element of H•162 there is no guarantee that 3' 
selects "the right" one. Believers do not play dice. The arbitrariness of max• 
contractions i avoided by the next model for belief revision. 
The skeptical option is full meet base change: In order to eliminate r from 
K, take all the elements of H•162 then close each under Cn, and finally take the 
intersection. ~ 
DEFINITION 2. For any base H for K, the full meet base contraction over K deter- 
mined by H is given by 
EK=r  iff VCandH;~ foreveryH' EH-l-r o rFCand~cK.  
Full meet contractions depart from the idea of minimal change, because the 
intersection of a set of maximal non-implying subsets is not itself a maximal non- 
implying subset. However, the symmetrical consideration of each element of H_l_r 
is required by our decision to let in no other information than is encoded in the 
structure of the explicit beliefs. Opting for full meet contraction thus means adhering 
to the equality of rights of the members in H_I_r 
Alchourr6n and Makinson [1] have shown that both max• and full meet 
contraction make good sense only if H is a non/theory. So let us emphasize right at 
the beginning that it is indeed essential for the following constructions that we have 
at our disposal a differentiation between explicit and implicit beliefs. This is not 
only a distinction which is desirable intuitively, but also a technical prerequisite. 
It would not be quite right to characterize our proposals as "theory change 
through base change" [5]. We do not want to stipulate that K - ' r  = Cn(H-r  
1 This should not be confused with the idea that all elements of H are equally well entrenched. 
In general they are not, according to Definition 10 below. 
2 Essentially the same method is applied by Veltman [24] and Kratzer [12] for the analysis of 
counterfaetuals, and by Poole [20] for nonmonotonic reasoning. 
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for some appropriate H- r  Let us illustrate why. Consider H = {p, q} and retract 
p A q from /~ = Cn(H). H_L(p A q) = {{p},{q}}, so under K-qb = Cn(H'-d2) , 
maxichoice would give us either K- (p  A q) = Cn({p}) or K - (p  A q) = Cn({q}), 
while full meet would give us K- (p  A q) = Cn(~). Neither of these solutions eems 
satisfactory. Intuitively, K- (p  A q) = Cn({p V q}) would be good. Assuming that 
one of p and q may be false, we should still cling to the belief that the other one 
is true. But H' = {p V q} is no base which can be constructed naturally from H-  
it certainly does not record any explicit belief. So we give up the aim of getting 
(K-~b, H'-8} from (K~ H} and stay content with the more modest aim of getting 
K-'~b from K with the help of the belief base H. That is, H is relevant, and indeed 
all that is relevant, for the construction of K - r  from K, but H will not get revised 
itself. Pictorially, instead of the desirable transition (K, H) '. ; (K - r162  we 
r 
will study the transition K ~ " K ' - r  There will be no suggestion as to the contents 
of H-" ~b. 
When inputs come in sets, we are presented with two different kinds of contrac- 
tion. The aim of a pick contraction is to give up at least one element of a set S, 
while the aim of a bunch contraction is to give up every element of a set S, both 
times with minimal mutilation of the original belief state, a In conformity with the 
basic idea of minimal change, we again focus on maximal non-implying subsets of 
H. 
Let H_L(S) be the set of all maximal subsets of H which do not imply every 
element of S, and H• the set of all maximal subsets of H which do not imply 
any element of S. Clearly, HJ_({~5}) = H•162 = HJ_~b. 
The concepts of maxichoice and full meet base contraction can be generalized 
naturally to cover pick and bunch contractions as well. As the case of maxiehoice 
contractions i entirely analogous, we restriet ourselves to full meet contractions. 
Borrowing F~hrmann's [4] symbols, we introduce 
DEFINITION 3. For any base H jbr K, the pick and bunch versions of multiple full 
meet base contraction over K are defined as follows: 
9 E K -  (S) eft H 'F  ~ for everTy H' E f t•  r O, or H_l_(S) =0 and g E K. 
r ~ K - / s ]  d ~' ~- 9 for evew Zr ~ H_L[S] r r or H_L[S] = O and 9 ~ K. 
From now on, we will drop curly brackets within pointed and square brackets, 
so K-'-[{40, 9}] will simplify to K-[qS, 9], and H_L({r 9}) to H i (C ,  9), etc. 
3. Ep is temic  ent renchment  
The  concept of epistemic entrenchment has turned out to be a natural and fruitful 
instrument for the analysis of belief change [6, 7, 8, 15, 21, 22, 23]. 'Epistemic 
entrenchment' is just another word  for comparative retractability. Intuitively, r < 
means  that it is easier to discard r than to discard 9- We may call this the basic 
3 Andr~ Fuhrmann [4] was  probab ly  the first to s tudy  pick and  bunch  contractions. He  called 
them choice and  meet  contractions. For danger  of confusion with maxichoiee and full meet  con- 
traction, we  introduce new names .  
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idea of epistemic entrenchment. Below we shall offer two interpretations of this idea 
in order to make it more precise. 
Technically, epistemic entrenchment relations are known to have a number of 
characteristic properties. The basic postulates are 
(EE l )  T N T (Non-Triviality) 
(EE2 T) if r < r and %0 F X, then r < X (Continuing Up) 
(EE2 l) if r < %0 and X F r then X < %0 (Continuing Down) 
(EE3 T) if r < r and r < X, then r < %0 A X (Conjunction Up) 
(EE3 t) if r A r < r then ~ < 9. (Conjunction Down) 
There is an equivalent and more economical set of postulates which does not 
mention any connective of the object language. First, we replace Non-Triviality by 
irreflexivity. Second, we note that postulates (EE2 T) and (EE3 T) taken together 
are equivalent o (EET), while (EE21) and (EE3 ~) taken together are equivalent o 
(EE +) (see [23]): 
(EE T) if r 
(EE $) if r 
< r for every r in a non-empty set S and S F 27, then r < X 
< %0 and {%0, X} ~- r then X < %0 9 
(EE4) if H V • then: _1_ < r iff H ~- r 
(EEh) if F/r then r < T 
(EE6) if r < %0, then r < X or X < %b 
Again purely 
(Minimality) 
(Maximality) 
(Virtual Connectivity) 
structural formulations of (EE4) and (EEh) are possible by substi- 
tuting 'there is a %0 such that %0 < r (such that % < %0)' for ~/< r (for 'r < T'). For 
the motivation and discussion of all these postulates, see G~rdenfors and Makinson 
[8] and Rott [231. Epistemic entrenchment relations are required to satisfy (EEl) 
- (EE3;) in [23], and in addition (EE4) - (EE6) in [8]. (In fact, G~rdenfors and 
Makinson work with the non-strict relation _< which can be defined from the strict 
relation < by taking the converse complement.) 
Given a relation of epistemie ntrenchment, how can we get a contraction function 
from it? For the principal case, where r C K and r < T, the standard definition 
[8, 23] is 
DEFINITION 4. For any relation < of epistemic entrenchment, the large EE-eontrac- 
tion with respect o < is given by 
%0cK'-r iff ~p E K, and r < r V ~p orF $ 
The presence of the disjunction r v %0 here is somewhat mysterious (to say the 
least). An alternative idea was ventilated in Rott [21]: 
The set of basic postulates may be supplemented by the following ones. 
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DEFINITION 5. For any relation < of epistemic entrenchment, he small EE-con- 
traction with respect o < is given by 
eEK- r  iff r  andr162 or~-r 
Both Definition 4 and Definition 5 make sure that K ' - r  is a theory and that 
the contraction function - satisfies a number of rationality postulates. Large EE- 
contractions; but not small EE-contractions, atisfy the so-called postulate of recov- 
ery: K C (K -e )  + r 
It follows from (EE2 T) that K - r  according to Definition 5 is a subset of K - r  
according to Definition 4--whence the names. Lindstr5m and Rabinowicz [15, Sec- 
tion 5] argue convincingly that given an epistemic entrenchment relation <, any 
reasonable contraction of K with respect o r should result in a belief set which 
includes the small and is included in the large EE-contraction. 
The basic idea of epistemic entrenchment is still very vague and ought to be made 
more precise. The first or competitive interpretation of it suggests to determine the 
relative ease of retracting a sentence by looking at the fate of r and r in a direct 
competition between r and r It reconstructs epistemic entrenchment from observed 
contraction behaviour [8, 23]: 
DEFINITION 6. For any contraction function : over K,  the epistemic entrenchment 
relation revealed by - is given by 
r < r i2' r e K : ( r  A r and r ~ K-'(r A r 
Definition 6 yields extremely nice results for large EE-contraction functions over 
a theory K. If the contraction function - satisfies certain rationality postulates, 
then < as obtained by Definition 6 is a relation of epistemie ntrenchment from 
which we can recover - with "the help of Definition 4. And conversely, if < is 
a relation of epistemic entrenchment, then : as obtained by Definition 4 satisfies 
certain rationality postulates and permits a reconstruction of < with the help of 
Definition 6. Details can be found in G~irdenfors and Makinson [8] and Rott [23]. 
In [23], I emphatically adopt the idea. that K - ( r  A r is to be interpreted as a 
multiple contraction, viz. the pick contraction with respect o {r r Contracting 
K with respect o r A % I argued, is exactly the same as retracting at least one of r 
and ~. In symbols, K - ( r  A ~) = K - ( r  ~}. The motivation of Definition 6 is then 
clear: if you have to give up either r or ~, and you give up r and keep r then 
has been more entrenched than ,r 
I do not see any intuitive reason for supposing that the identity K - ( r  r = 
K- '  (r162 is inadequate in some applications. Still it is good to be prepared for 
this possibility. Another motive for modifying Definition 6 is that we want to avoid 
explicit mentioning of particular connectives, in order to make the epistemie n- 
trenchment approach applicable to restricted languages as encountered for instance 
in semantic networks. We take the motivation of Definition 6 seriously and suggest 
the following improvement: 
DEFINITION 7. /;'or any contraction function = over K,  the epistemic entrenchment 
relation revealed by "- is given by 
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< i?] and r r r 
This interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment builds on the 
concept of pick contraction. 
4. Fu l l  meet  base  cont ract ion  as  extended ep is temic  ent rench-  
ment  cont ract ion  
In order to be able to deal with full meet base contractions in terms of epistemic 
entrenchment, we extend the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment to sets of sen- 
tences. From now on, '{S) << {T}' is intended to mean that it is easier to discard 
some element of S than to discard some element of T. '[S] << [T]' is intended to 
mean that it is easier to discard all elements of S than to discard all elements of 
T. We shall speak of extended epistemic entrenchment in the sequel, with the two 
types pick and bunch entrenchment. 
Let us try to extend the competitive interpretation of epistemic entrenchment 
accordingly. For pick entrenchment, this is easy. The obvious suggestion is
(S)<<(T)  iff TC_K: (SUT)  andSgK- (SuT) .  
But for bunch entrenchment, there is no sensible condition which can be formal- 
ized with the present means. 
So we propose another understanding of--possibly extended~pistemie entrench- 
ment. The second or minimal change interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic 
entrenchment builds on the basic idea of minimal change. It reads 'is easier' as 'does 
not require as great an informational loss as' or 'sacrifices fewer explicit beliefs than'. 
Formally, preference is identified with the proper subset relation 'C'. Let us define 
the following version of extended epistemic entrenchment: 
DEFINITION 8. For any base H fo, ~ K, the relation << of bunch entrenchment gen- 
erated by H is defined by 
[S] << [T] iff for every H' C_ H such that Cn(H') N T = ~ there is an H" such 
that H ~ C H" C_ H and Cn(H") N S = ~, and V ~ for evew ~ in S. 
The following equivalent formulation is sometimes more convenient: 
OBSERVATION 1. Let H be a base for K, and << be the bunch entrenchment generated 
by H. Then IS] << IT] iff for every H' C H_k[T] there is an H" E HI[S] such that 
H' C H", and H.L[S] ~ O, i.e., iff H_L[T] r H.L[S], and H_k[S] 7~ O. 
(The proofs of the observations are given in the full paper.) We spare the reader 
the analogous definition of pick entrenchment, and we do not want to enter into a 
discussion of the properties of <<. We now observe that full meet base contractions 
allow an elegant characterization in terms of bunch entrenchment. 
OBSERVATION 2. Let H be a base for K, - be the full meet base contraction deter- 
mined by H, and << be the relation of bunch entrenchment generated by H. Then 
r e t ( - r  i# [r << [r 
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We can directly represent full meet base contractions as extended EE-contractions 
in the following sense. 
DEFINITION 9. For any relation << of bunch entrenchment, the EEE-contraction 
with respect o << is given by 
eEK: r  iff eEK ,  and[r162162 or~r  
Like Definition 5, this definition is connective-free. 
5. Ep is temic  ent renchment  generated  by  be l ie f  bases  
Given a base H for K, we now try to find a more familiar, i.e., non-extended, relation 
of epistemic entrenchment without beforehand committing ourselves to a certain 
contraction method. We again exploit the basic idea of epistemie ntrenchment. 
As it happens, the competitive and the minimal change interpretation of it can be 
unified in the present ease. For the definition, we employ the latter one: 
DEFINITION 10. For any base H for K, the relation of epistemie ntrenchment gen- 
erated by H is given by 
< r iff ~r  and for every H' C H such that H t ~/~ there is an H" such that 
H' C H" C H and H" ~/ r 
This is a singleton version of Definition 8. Clearly, it is a negative interpretation 
of epistemic entrenchment, focussing on the ways to discard a belief. It is intuitively 
well-motivated. Roughly, r is more entrenched than r iff for every way of discarding 
r there is a better way of discarding r As a special case of Observation 1, we take 
clown 
OBSERVATION 3. Let H be a base for K, and < be generated by H. Then r < r iff 
~/ r and for ever~d H ~ E H•162 there is an .H n E H•162 such that H ~ C H' ,  i.e., iff 
~/ r and H•162 E H• 
So r is more entrenched than r if for every "best" way of discarding r there 
is a still better "best" way of discarding r More exactly, in terms of maxichoice 
contraction functions, if for every 3' there is a 7 ~ such that the maxichoice base 
contraction of K with respect o r determined by 7' properly includes the maxichoice 
base contraction of K with respect o r determined by 7. 
In the following, we trace some of the implications of this definition. First, we 
verify that Definition 10 generates a relation of epistemic entrenchment in the gener- 
alized sense of Rott [23], but not in the standard sense of G~rdenfors and Makinson 
[8]. Then we show that for full meet base contractions the two interpretations of the 
basic idea of epistemie ntrenchment coincide. In the next section, we show that full 
meet base contractions, which are EEE-contractions characterized by Definitions 8 
and 9, can be interpolated by means of small and large EE-contraetions based on the 
epistemic entrenchment relation generated by the base. Although the approximation 
cannot in general be strengthened to an identity, sometimes a perfect agreement can 
be attained. 
It is easy to verify that the relation < defined in Definition 10 has the following 
properties: 
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OBSERVATION 4. For every belief base H, the relation < generated by H satisfies 
(EEl)  - (EE2$) and (EEl)  - (EE5), but it does not satisfy (EE6). 
That is, Definition 10 does not yield an epistemic entrenchment relation in the 
sense of G~rdenfors and Makinson [8], but it does yield an epistemic entrenchment 
relation in the less demanding sense of Rott [23]. 
If pick contractions are formalized as in Definition 3, Definition 10 turns out to be 
equivalent with the first interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment as
formalized in Definition 7. In the present context, the competitive and the minimal 
change interpretations of epistemic entrenchment coincide. 
OBSERVATION 5.(COINCIDENCE LEMMA). Let H be a base for K, let < be the epis- 
temic entrenchment relation generated by H and <~ be the epistemic entrenchment 
relation revealed by the pick version of multiple full meet base contraction. Then 
r < • i2fr <' r 
6. Full meet base contractions as approximated by epistemic 
entrenchment contractions 
Suppose that the epistemic entrenchment relation < is generated by the belief base H 
for K. We wonder about the relation between full meet base contractions generated 
by H (or alternatively, by Definitions 8 and 9) on the one hand and the large 
and small EE-eontractions based on < on the other. Is it possible to get what we 
got by extended epistemic entrenchment above with the help of singleton epistemic 
entrenchment? As for large EE-contractions, the answer must be negative, because 
they are known to satisfy the recovery postulate, which base contractions notoriously 
do not. 
It turns out that singleton epistemic entrenchment is insufficient in general, but 
an approximation by upper and lower bounds is possible. The entrenchment relation 
determined by a belief base H with the help of Definition 10 allows us to follow the 
above-mentioned recommendation f LindstrSm and Rabinowicz. We can interpolate 
full meet base changes according to Definition 2, i.e., EEE-changes according to 
Definitions 8 and 9, by large and small EF~changes according to Definitions 4 and 
5. 
OBSERVATION 6 (INTERPOLATION LEMMA). Let H be a base for K and < be the 
entrenchment relation generated by H. Furthermore, let "- be the full meet base 
contraction function determined by H, let -1 be the small and -2 be the large EE- 
contraction with respect o <. Then 
K ' - I~  C_ K ' - r  C_ K ' -2 r  
The converse inclusions are not valid. 
In a couple of cases, the correspondence b tween full meet base contraction and 
epistemic entrenchment contraction is perfect, if the latter is to mean large EE- 
contraction based on the relation < generated by the belief base H. There are at 
least three ways of equivalence. We list them in increasing importance. 
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Theories. The first case is when the base H is already a belief set, i.e., when 
H = K. However, this case is of limited relevance. The epistemic entrenchment 
relation generated by K is nearly empty if K is a theory, because then K ~ E K•162 
and K H E K_kr imply K' ~_ K", unless K" equals K. So in this case, r < 
according to Definition 10 can hold only if either ~ E K and r ~ K, or F r and ~/r 
This corresponds to a well-known trivialization result of Alchourrdn and Makinson 
[1, Observation 2.1] for full meet contractions of theories. 
Nebel's blown-up contractions. The second ease in point is when full meet base 
contraction is supplemented with a mechanism to enforce the recovery postulate. 
This is basically the suggestion of Nebel [19]: 
DEFINITION 11. For any base H for K, the blown-up contraction "- is given by 
r E K'--r iff (K : I  r U {r : X E H} F r where KIn1 r is the full meet base 
contraction determined by H. 
The set Rec = {r X E H} is a recovery ticket which allows one to "undo" a 
base contraction with respect o r It is easy to check that on Definition 11, K = 
(K -e )  + r for every r in K. But since clearly -~b implies every element of Rec, 
and Rec in turn implies q5-,r for every r in K, we find that r E K - r  according 
to Definition 11 iff r V r E K - r  according to Definition 2. It is not difficult to see 
that this is equivalent to saying the r is in the large EE-contraction of K based on 
the epistemic entrenchment relation generated by H. 
Revisions based on the Levi identity. Thirdly, the correspondence is perfect if a 
contraction is only an intermediate for a revision constructed with the help of the 
Levi identity. Since, by Levi and the deduction theorem, r is in K * r iff r162 
is in K '---~r we have to cheek K - - - r  only for sentences of the form C--*r But 
clearly, for every EE-relation <, -~r < (r162 is equivalent to --r < - , r162  so 
Definitions 4 and 5 are equivalent for sentences of the form r162 in K'--~r Hence, 
by the Interpolation Lemma, either form of EE-revision is identical with full meet 
base revision. 
7. Conc lus ion  
The aim of this report has been to provide an illustration for the versatility of the 
concept of epistemie ntrenchment, to apply epistemic entrenchment to belief states 
("bases") which are not supposed to be logically closed, and to further the intuitive 
understanding of epistemic entrenchment and its relation to multiple contraction. 
Our starting point has been a fixed belief base H generating a belief set K. 
Our concern is "syntax-based" belief change, or belief change determined by belief 
bases, and we assume that the structure of H is the sole information governing the 
changes of K. We have given a reformulation of full meet base contractions as ex- 
tended EE-contractions: Definition 2 is equivalent to the combination of Definitions 
8 and 9. This representation depends on an extension of epistemic entrenchment to
sets of sentences ("bunch entrenchment"). We elaborated on the basic idea of epis- 
temic entrenchment ascomparative r tractability by giving it two different readings. 
The usual "competitive" interpretation was distinguished from what we called the 
"minimal change interpretation" of the phrase '~ is harder to discard than r 
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We proposed a method of extracting an epistemic entrenchment relation < from 
a belief base H. Discovering that Definition 10 is equivalent to the combination of 
Definitions 3 and 7, we observed a confluence of the two interpretations of epistemic 
entrenchment (the "Coincidence Lemma"). It was demonstrated that upper and 
lower bounds of full meet base contractions can be specified in the form of large 
and small EE-contractions based on the relation < generated by the belief base (the 
"Interpolation Lemma" ).
Since the publication of O~irdenfors's Knowledge in Flwc, relations of epistemie 
entrenchment have been known to be interdefinable with belief contractions. For 
theory change by singletons, the following transitions are standard in the literature: 
r iff %bEK-(r andr162162 
9EK- r  iff CeK ,  andr162162162 
To my mind, there is no denying that these bridge principles are the pivotal 
points of an illuminating and well-developed theory of belief change [6, 8, 21, 22, 23]. 
However, the occurrences of %' and 'v' are somewhat mysterious. This is why I 
suggest a more transparent way to think of the interdefinability between epistemie 
entrenchment and belief change. 
r162  iff r162162 andr162162 (Definition 7) 
Full meet base specialization: if - is the full meet base contraction 
determined by H, then, by Observations 3 and 5, r < %b is definable by 
H•162 u H•162 
Singleton reformulation: ~ E g- ' ( r  A r and r ~ K - ( r  A r 
r C K - r  iff ~b C K, and [r << [r ~] or I- r (Definition 9) 
Full meet base specialization: if << is the bunch entrenchment generated 
by H, then, by Observation 2, full meet base contraction coincides with 
EEE-contraction, and r C K' - r  is definable by HJ_[r r E HJ_[r 
Singleton interpolation: in so far as r < ~ implies [r << [r r and this 
in turn implies r < r V ~, large and small EE-contractions can serve as 
upper and lower bounds of EEE-contractions 
Our deviation from the standard account is clear. We invoke sets with two el- 
ements as arguments for contraction operations and entrenchment relations. More 
specifically, we replace, in the direction from belief change to epistemic entrench- 
ment, the contractions with respect o conjunctions by pick contractions, and in 
the direction from epistemic entrenchment to belief change, the entrenchments of 
disjunctions by bunch entrenchments. 
What is the reward for this exercise? First and foremost, we get a better un- 
derstanding ofthe relevant interrelations. They sometimes happen to reduce to the 
standard efinitions. But what is really meant by the latter is, I submit, precisely 
what is made explicit by the new definitions. In one direction, I should think there is 
virtually no difference: K -  ( r A r seems to be intuitively identifiable with K -  (r r }. 
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In the other direction, however, it is only the restricted context of theory change 
by singletons that makes our new definition reduce to the old one: [r << [r ~] 
may--and must!--then be identified with r < r V r 
Secondly, we manage without reference to any particular connective of the object 
language. Thus the theory of epistemic entrenchment becomes applicable to systems 
using a severely restricted language. For instance, we can speak of the entrenchment 
of the nodes in inheritance nets or reason maintenance systems (also called "truth 
maintenance systems"). There ought to be a corresponding connective-free formula- 
tion of the so-called Gs postulates for contraction operations. The obvious 
suggestion is to replace occurrences of 'K'-(CA r by 'K ' - (r  r The elimination of 
connectives, however, works only for belief contractions. Belief revisions constructed 
according to the Levi identity make use of negations, and there does not seem to be 
a straightforward way to avoid this. 4 
At last, we should like to give two warnings. The connective-free formulation 
of epistemic entrenchment relations and theory contractions i only a by-product of 
this paper, slightly improving on the presentation i [23]. It is not necessary for 
the analysis of syntax-based belief change which turns essentially on the syntactical 
structure of the items in a belief base. There is no immediate transfer of insights 
from belief base update to updates in inheritance networks or reason maintenance 
systems ("RMSs') with their unstructured "nodes". It may be expedient for some 
purposes to identify RMS "justifications" with Horn clauses. But this certainly does 
not suffice for nonmonotonic systems. Our Cn is supposed to be monotonic. 
Multiple contraction and extended epistemic entrenchment have been found to 
be an appropriate means for analyzing base contraction. However--this i the second 
warning--, the conepts of multiple contraction and extended epistemic entrenchment 
themselves, cut loose from the special context of maxichoice and full meet base 
contraction, are still very much in need of a thoroughgoing analysis. This is evidently 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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